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Popp: Educational theory in the remainder of the century

Roots of traditional progressivism still offer the best ba·
sis of building a sound view
of education.

Educational
theory
in the
remainder
of the century
By Jerome A. Popp
As we enter the 1980s it seems appropriate to reflect
upon the natu re o f our inquiry-as it was, is, and shou ld
be in the future. I want to suggest that it is time to
seriously reconsider the tenets of educational pro·
gressivism. I will not be suggesting that we simply iden·
tlfy educational progressivism as it existed in the first
20 years of this century and reinstate it in the last 20 years;
what I hope to show is that the roots of traditional
progressivism still offer the best basis for building a
sound view of education for now and the future. It
behooves us to view our work as growi ng out of traditional
progressivism and toward a neoprog ressivism.
1. The Present Scene
At th is time we can look around and find: " humanistic
education"'- the " hands
" off view of pedagogy and
schooling-wobbling without a clear direction. Perhaps
its followers have mad e their points and are now at a loss
as to what to do nex t. This is plausible, for humanistic
doctrine is philosophically thin , lacking the comprehen·
siveness or penetration to support prolonged action. I
shall return to this view in the third section of the present
paper.
The transmissionist or impositional view-hu·
manism's historical adversary-seems to be healthy
with educational technology, i.e., the technology of
pedagogical imposi tion, continuing to attract great au·
diences. The brutalness of imposition reflec ted in the
Hoosier's School Master's reading , 'riting , and 'rithmetic
taught to the tune of a hickory stick, seems to be in vogue
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again in " back to basics." It seems to me that the trans·
mission view with its ever-present technology Is pres·
ently in position of the greatest momentum with regard
to schooling and school policy-making. If we education·
lsts allow the present trend to fulfill itself we can expect
to find impositional lh<:lory dominating the 1980s.
Optimists will say that humanistic education is less
noticeable at present because many o f its princ iples have
become internalized by the establishmen t. Yet anyone
who is at all sensitive to !be notion of logical consistency
must doubt this; how can human istic principles be in·
ternal ized by teachers who are taking more and more o f an
educational technological view of things?
If impositionism is to continue to dominate peda·
gogical practice, then we must be prepared to accept its
consequences. In modern social life, more than any
other time in human history, Imposition is met with
resistance. Conceptually, imposition and resistance are
rec iprocal notions. When you are imposed upon, you
resist; when school child ren and young adults are im·
posed upon they resist. The transmission theory and its
supported pract ice c learly identifies imposition. We are
less familiar with Its reci
procal
resis tance. But let us
examine it.
Resistance can take t wo basic forms: active and
passive. Active resis tance attempts to disrupt the im·
position, weakening its impact. Passive resistance allows
imposition to manifest itself but seeks to lessen its im ·
pact by giving It no target. In school, active resis ters are
" d isc ipline problems," while passive resisters are "mo·
tivation problems." School authority knows how to deal
with active resistance. But passive resistance is enigma.
Passive resistance draws no punishment, just ignoral.
Yet, passive resistance has its price-it's boring. • 8.ecent
...., -.
attent ion has focused upon the use o f drugs
by secondary, junior high and even elementary students.
It is not possible that through the use of drugs the docil ity
required by transmissional imposition becomes bearable?
As far as I can determine, no drug usage studies exist
which consider the type o f pedagogy as an independent
variable. Yet, is it not plausible that drug usage is rendered
effective given the impositional nature of the schooling
environment? This is a significant area of empirical re·
search which, as I see it, deserves our attention in the
1980's. If, as I am suggesting, drug usage is patterned ac·
cord ing to pedagogical imposition, then this alone is evi·
dence against impositionism in schooling.
2. The Transmission View of Schooling
There has always been wi th us, from Protagorus to
Gagne, a transmission view of pedagogy and schooling. If
one asks the average adult or undergraduate, " What are
the purposes of the school or teaching?" one invariably
receives a tradit ional transmissionist account of the ends
of schooling. This tradition is quite strong and dom inates ,
as near as I can tell, the thinking of the typical person . Yet,
transmissionism has not remained static and \vas
noticeably modified at the midpoint of this c entury. For
this reason it is best to review transm issionism in two
parts: traditional and modern.
Traditional Transmissionism
In the time of the ancients, there were established
cultural facts and values into which chi ldren could be
initiated. Since the content transmitted was stable and
noncontroversial, the initiat ion process seemed straight
forward . By the late nineteenth century, John Dewey
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challenged this process. His classic Democracy and
Education and his equally important Interest and Effort in
Education, both published in the second decade of the
twentieth century, constituted formidable opposition to
straight transmisslonl sm.
The end of transmissionism, (i) a body of knowledge
and skill, and (Ii) standards of conduct, whether pursued
by the " Effort Theory" (or formal discipline) or the "In·
terest Theory" (or sugar coating the bitterpill) was at·
tacked by Dewey in the classic argument that the object
was assumed to be apart and alien to the developing child,
and that all experience with children denied this assump·
lion As an alternative view. a new view o f schooling was
propounded -progressive education.
While Dewey's arguments keep traditional trans·
missionism on the ropes for the first third o f the twen·
tleth century-it was never knocked out-the extreme
child-centered wing of the Progressive Education Association undermined his attack. After all, If the project of
study was part of the chi ld's nature, why not keep handsoff and let th ings unfold according to nature's plan?
Dewey's attack on the impositionism o f the transmission
view ironically cleared the way for permlssivism. Dewey,
of course, was attacking both imposltlonism and the
romantic hands·off approach when he claimed "psychotogized " the child. Yet when one reads his words today, the attack upon the impositionism of transmission
thinking seems to receive the heaviest blows.
Modern Transmisslonlsm
At midcentury Ralph Tyler laid out his curriculum
technology and it received a strong positive response.
There had been earlier transmisslonlsts who sought efficiency, but by Tyler' s time there seemed to be less opposition. Tylerian technology sought to improve outcomes by improving means.
A decade later The Process ot Education appeared,
which of course originated " the structure of the
disciplines movement" in curriculum development. If we
could clarify the ends, the means would
ow. foll
Aim for
the basic s truc ture, and chi ldren will be released
somehow to become little scienti sts and mathematicians.
Child psychologists were out and Ph.0.'s from the
disciplines were in . It is as if the arts and sciences
professors had finally won over professors of education,
and they walked with arrogance through the captured
public schools.
·
Yet things did not go as predicted. In 1971 Bruner, in
" The Process of Education Revisited," took it all back.
I believe I would be quite satisfied to declare, if
not a moratorium , then som ething of a de·
emphasis on matters that have to do with the
structure of history, the structure of physics,
the nature of mathematical consistency, and
deal with it rather in the contex t of the
problems that face us.'
If Einstein could ask Newton's forgiveness for being
right, Bruner should have asked for Dewey's for being
wrong.
While the structure of the disciplines movement has
faded in science and mathematics, It Is somewhat alive In
philosophy. From Kohlberg's moral development theory
and Lipman's Philosophy for Children movement, one expects to find some teachers viewing value and/or moral
education the way the structure of the disciplines
teachers viewed their subjects. I am not claiming that
Winier, 1980
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Kohlberg or Lipman and their theoretical associates are
" Jonnie·come·lately's" to Brunerism. This is not the
case. But I am concerned that some users of these ideas
may fall into the same view as the earlier Bruneri tes;
namely, some may come to view their task as trying to get
the student to discover or build th e basic structures o f
moral reasoning like math and physics were supposed to
be built. Whether we should have moral curricula, or what
form they should take is not my point: I only want to warn
against making the same mistakes contained in the structure of the disciplines approach-thinking that curriculum
organization and materials are all that are required, whi le
Ignoring educational psychology and teacher effective·
ness research.
·
By the late 1960's, behaviorism and educational tech ·
nology (actually pedagogical technology) were growing
strong. As the structure of the d isc
iplines movement
faded, the void in the foundations o f transmissionIsm was filled with behaviorist technology. Transmission·
ism was back to looking at its means again with the ends
becoming of less concern. Philosophers will consider the
behaviorist version of transmissioni sm Its most accept·
able form, for it emphasizes individual differences in its
principle that what Is reinforcing for o ne may not be so for
another, and for its emphasis on positive reinforce·
ment and ba.n ishment of punishment. At present, behav·
lorlsm seems alive and w ell
. I shall return to it later.
3. The Romantic View of Schooling
An alternative to the transmission view, romantic per·
missivism, views childhood as complete in and of itself,
requiring not active intervention bu l protection from intervention; ' intervention' is equated with 'Imposition'. The
earlier forms of romanticism and Its unfolding view of
human development are familiar. Romanticism is often ac·
cused of being based upon a biological growth metaphor,
but this is inaccurate for there was no metaphor intended.
Currently the romantic conception of pedagogy has taken
two forms: " humanistic" education and developmentalism.
Human istic Education
Humanistic education, as it is erroneously labeled, is
said to derive from third force psychology . Maslow has led
the way with Rogers contributing somewhat, and Combs
Influencing curriculum theory. Maslow is a neo-Aristolleian with selfactualization as the Final Cause for persons; philosophically this brand of determinism will
simply not wash. If leads to all sorts of blunders such as
confusions over the meaning of 'can' and 'ought', and the
role and nature o f free choice. His " hierarchy o f needs"
grounds his straight-line determin ism, making the
evaluations of alternative directions unnecessary. In
surely one o f his most absurd moments he equates the
development of a child with that of a flower and kitten. I
will not embarrass you with an analysis of this absurdity.
K.P. Morgan once referred to Schwab as the Pied
Piper of Curriculum theory,' but I have another candidate:
Arthur w. Combs. As he recently put it, " The Humanistic
Movement .• . is a revolution in human though!, a
necessary occurrence in the sweep of human events."'
We, of course, do not know the historical scope of this
neoenlightment. But it seems to be third force enlight·
ment. As he sees it, we are faced with a choice between
two systems of thinking: one open, one closed. We are at a
fork In the road. We, In education, always seem to be at a
fork or a crossroad; actually, I think we are, and have been
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for some time, o n a rotary.
The choice between two altern
atives
mmits"co
us to
soph
quite different philosophical positions." The closed
syslem depends upon a " management class," a "great
man" . . . " who knows where the people sho uld go," and a
" diclal
orship." "Open syslems are egalitorian ... essentially democratic." In fact, as Combs puts it,
From my point of view one of the comfort ing
things about dealing with problems from an
open system is its congruence with the
democratic philosophy. My psychology is nol
th
basically out of louch with my philosophy.•
Of course Combs is committing the either/or fallacy,
but what is interesting is 1hat he knows it. He quotes
Kelly: " Whenever you find Ideas expressed at opposite
ends of a continuum in either/or fashion, it is almost certain they are both wrong."'
's Ignoring Kelly confusion
of degree and k ind, we find Combs agreeing with Kelly
(which is to ag ree with confusion) and nevertheless continui ng to d iscuss his either/or reali ty.
Without belaboring l he argument, I want to simply
state that the so-cal led humani stic movement In education is without inlelleclu
ald ership.
l
ea m

Oevelopmenta
lis
The word 'development' under Piage t's In fl uence has
taken on a special meaning . 'Development' suggests to
most educationists 'develo
alis pment
m". The latler is a
hybrid form of in nalism. Piage t Is a neo-Kantlan
.
Kant
viewed the mind as innately struc tured In his doc trine o l
synthetic a priori truths. Piaget objecls claiming that Kan t
was talking about the mos t mature minds. Bui these s tructures are not in place at birth. Rather, they develop In three
or four distinct stages.
But why do they develop? Children encounter ex·
perience and sooner or later become disequillbraled.
Their cognitive structures do nol work well at explaining
experience. This does not depend on Individual purposes.
Disequilibrium is solely bio logical-a dysfunctional organism-environment relationshi p.
How do these struc tures develop? Thro ugh assimilation and accommodation equilibration is reestablished. Assimilation is the process of coming at experience. It is what the person can do or make o f the environment. Accommodation Is what the environment
makes of the person. Through accommodation one
modifies one's structures, producing more adequate
assimilations. Empiricists erred , according to Piaget, in
believing that accommodation could go on without its
complementary assimilations. Kant erred in the opposite
direction by focusing on assimilation and omitting the
point that accommodation was also going on. We might
say that Kant discovered assimilation process through his
trying to accommodate rationalist and empiricist thinging,
while Piaget discovered accommodation by trying to
assimilate both Kant's thinking and children's thinking .
Ph ilosophically, Piaget Is a neo-Kantlan committed to
synthetic a priori truths. Within contemporary philosophy
of science and philosophy o f mind thi s is untenable. He
ignores the synthetic and analytic func tions o f belie fs. I
believe that th is omi ssion is gen erated by hi s rejection of
human purpose and hi s complete dependenc e on biology
as the basis of knowing. The Issues here are histor
ically
wide and philosophically deep, and cannot be settled in
this or any other short paper. All I want to establish is that
Piagetian theory is based upo n a rationalis tic conception

of mind. Serious
onal educati
theorists should not commit
to Piaget's views or suggestions without careful
al phllo·
ic analysis of Piaget' s basic assumptions.• The
further analysis of Piaget has to be a high agenda Item for
the 1980s.
4. Traditional Progressivism
Under Dewey the progressive alternative took its
basic shape. As I read him he sought to give a systemalic,
comprehensive, consistent accoun t o f the student,
pedagogy, curriculum content, and the school and Its
social context. In other words, he envisioned educatlooal
ry
eo as g iving an account of four factors, which may be
thought of as follows:
student

con text
To ignore any one of these four was to court dlsas.ter.
But how can these factors be approached theoonal
theory was based
retically? Dewey's account of educati
upon lhree fundamental theoretical fac tors: education,
democracy and inquiry. Again I will present a bit o f geometry.
education

inquiry
Education is, o f course, the highest value by which all
else is to be evaluated. The criterion of growth is the
theoretical absolute by which all else is measured. This,
by the way, is what the psychological humanism of the
1970s was in its feeble way trying to get at but could not
bec ause of its ignoral of philosophy. Education was
achieved, accord ing to Dewey, by inquiry on the personal
level and democracy on the soc ial level. Only under the
conditions of democracy is adequate inquiry possible; but
this was not the argumen t. Only und er d emocratic con ·
ditions could the criterion o f growth be fully achieved .
Democracy frees both education and inquiry. Democracy
provides the social conditions for education, wh ich frees
inqui ry, which allows for the reconstruc tion o f experience
. . . , i.e., education.
Thro ugh philosophical analysis. Dewey tried to
elaborate the natu re or these three theorell
cal
fac tors.
Many of his writings are well -known, but, it seems, poorly
understood . If I may be so brash to cri ticize In a few
EDUCATIONA
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lines his over thirty books and thousands of papers, I want
to suggest that his weaknesses are to· be found in two
areas; one of which I give him no responsibility-in fact he
contributed very positively to it, and another which I al·
tribute to him great responsibility. ThP. first of these Is
educational psychology. Dewey was not practicing sci·
ence yet he gave II many Important ideas. At Dewey's
time educational psychology was just emerging under
Thorndike who was, of course, a transmissionist. No edu·
cational psychology was on the scene which was based
upon progressive assumptions. Dewey was developing
the progressive theory, but he could hardly be expected to
develop it in all areas.
The second weakness in progressivism was of his
making. In his desire to pu t together all that was separate
he went, in my view, too far in his account o f inQuiry. As
Chuck Brauner observes, before 1911 Dewey viewed
inquiry as being of two pieces: one which served practical
purposes and one which served scientific purposes. But
by 1929, "Dewey welded those two approaches to ex·
perimentation Into a new approach to the idea of a
discipline of education."' Contemporary logic questions
the sagacily of this approach. Some philosophers of
science want to render asunder what Dewey sought to put
together: theoretical and practical wisdom. As I shall
argue, this approach has warrant. In current educational
research there Is a good deal of interest in separating
theoretical and "evaluation" studies. This distinction by
the way has been much clearer than the old basic/applied
distinc tion ever was.
5. Sources of a Neo-Progressivism
,
the transmission and romantic
Stated negatively
views give us an Impetus to seek alternatives. More
positively, the weakn esses in tradit ional progressive
thinking are at present remedial. Contemporary psycho!·
ogy and philosophy, in my view, o ffer possibi lities lor re·
constructlonlng progressivism. As Ryle once said of
Hume, many have mistaken his footsteps for his destina·
tion, one could also say this of Dewey.
Psychological Sources
Psychological thinking during the golden age of
progressivism was bifurcated into behaviorism and what
Dewey called " psychologizing" the child by various forms
of animism. Behaviorism has continued to grow reaching
full maturity under B. F. Skin ner. G.H. Mead once com·
mented that behaviorism was part of the "stimulus for a
pragmatic philosophy."' There has always been an affinity
between behaviorism and pragmatism; however, the two
part company on the question of the role of human pur·
pose and the related notion of consciousness in ex·
plaining behavior. Prag mati sm viewed behavi orism as too
narrow and hence incomplete.
Within the development o f psychology, there has de·
veloped an alternative form of behaviorism which departs
from the basic tradition from Watson to Skinner. Ban·
dura's "Social Learning Theory" represents a refinement
of Toulman's
sive
"purpo
behaviorism"
which was itself a
psychological theory more in line with progressivism. I
believe that Bandura's approach to psychology offers a
scientific study of behavior which is based upon a
metaphysics which is consistent with the earlier pro·
gressive views of human nature. Furthermore, I believe
that Bandura's views offer us a scientific view of learning
and experience which can provide for the development of
a progressive theory of education. The earlier progres·
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slvlsm·s educational psychology was adumbrated but
never developed into an ongoing area of scientific inquiry.
I am claiming that Bandura provides us with this actual·
lzed inQuiry. Thus, a soft spot In lraditional progressivism
Is presently remedial. Bandura's Social Learning Theory
bolsters progressive thinking and fills a gap which Dewey
had to accept-but wh ich we no longer have to.
In his recent book, Social Learning Theory, Bandura
briefly discusses the alternallve conceptions of social in·
teraction. This attempt seems to clarify the nature of
social interaction as it func llons as a basic metaphysic al
framework for his sclenllflc endeavors. He claims that,
" behavior, other personal factors, and environmental lac·
lors all operate as interlocking de terminants of each
other."
A valid criti cism of extreme behaviorism is
that, in a vigorous effort to avoid spurious inner
causes, it has neg lected determinants of
behavior arising from cognillve functioning ...
Because some of the inner causes involved by
theorists over the years have been Ill-founded
does not justify excluding all
deterln1erna1
minants from scientific inquiry.•
Bandura is attempting to broaden the behaviorist
framework by opening the metaphysical locus standi to
the existence of "internal" factors without explaining
behavior in terms of antecedents as various innatist
theories do. He is searching for an organism-environment
relationship which is not one dimensional as are both environmentalist and antecedent accounts. Note how this
view Is c ongruent with the hyphenated reality view held by
Dewey. That is, Dewey rejected both the innatist o r an·
teceden1 view, and the rad ical envi ronmental ist view of
how behavior is explained. ln natlsm locates the deter·
ml nan ts o f behavior wi thin the organism, while environmentalism places these solely within the envi·
ronment. Dewey argued that behavior Is best explained by
appeal to, and the analyses of, the relationships which
form between the organism and the environment of that
organism. Consciousness is one of these relationships
between an organism and a part of the environment or
"situation," as Dewey called ii. Purpose is another. II
seems to me that it is precisely this explanatory
melhodology which Bandura and his associates are investigating.
My purpose here is not to review and critiq ue Social
Learning Theory from a progressive point of view. All I
want to do Is to ind icate how th is theory enhances
traditional progressivism. My argument is stronger, however, lhan simply showing the theoretical compatability of
Bandura and Dewey. Social Learni ng Theory is worthy of
our attention for other reasons.
Skinner, in his behavioris t analysis of ord inary Ian·
guage (About Behaviorism, 1974), admits the existence o f
reflective thinking but claims thal It is covert behavior
which is modeled on overt behavior. "The words used to
describe covert behavior are the words acquired when
behaving publicaly." Skinner also claims that the observation of covert behavior is easy but does not tell us
just how this is to be accomplished. For all of his careful
analysis of many terms used In and around psychology, he
says very little about covert behavior. Skinner's push for
logical completeness seems to be having the effect of
revealing an incompleteness in his theory, and possibly
opening up radical behaviorism lo the arguments of
trad itional progressivism. Behaviorism Is thus by no

s
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means an unassailable alternative to progressive theory.
The other contemporary alternative to the progressive
metaphysical framework is the antecedent view of human
nature (alias: Jnnatlsm, romantic psychology, humanistic
psychology, preformationlsm, and developmentalism). As
I have ind icated, the "humanistic" theoretical foundations
lack cogency, and the developmentalism of Piaget is
based on a philosophy which has always had its em·
barrassments. In other words, either direction which the
antecedent view has taken leads into the teeth of
trad itional philosophical objections. Stated differently, of
the th ree traditional possibilities for philosophy of psy·
chology, rationalism, empiricism, and pragmatism, prag·
matic psychology is by no-means any weaker than its al·
ternatives (objective empiricism or behaviorism and sub·
jective empiricism or "humanism"), and I believe that So·
c ial Learning Theory is, as a form of neoprogressivism, a
good deal stronger. In other words, the psychological
basis of neoprogresslvism is now emerg ing.
Philosophical Sources
As I have already indicated, I believe that the main
weakness in Dewey's philosophy was his movement in
logic away from his earlier distinction between practical
and epistemic ends for inquiry. His holding to the ultimate
value, growth, in no way undermines the warrant for
separating two distinct kinds of thinking. Obviously we ex·
peel that theoretical thinking will observe the criterion of
growth (growth in theory); but it is also possible to view
practical inquiry as also respecting the criterion of
growth-thus, producing practical growth. It will be
remembered that in Experience and Education Dewey
argued that no other requi rements need be added to the
notion of growth to justify or warrant a line of develop·
ment; the criterion of growth was both necessary and suf·
ficient. This argument-the argument from education or
growth-separates Dewey from the maturationist or an·
tecedent views of educational theory, neo-Aristotleians
like Maslow and neo-Kantians like Piaget, and c learly
establishes an alternative orientation or framework for
educational theory. My point is that while the criterion of
growth is both necessary and sufficient for judging the
worthwhileness of any line of development, it does not
make any line of development the only warranted one.
Development can take many legitimate forms; that is,
whether a child decides to become a physician, a teacher,
a nuc lear engineer, or an administrator, the criterion of
growth is satisfied if and only if what one learns or what
habits one forms allow for continued growth. This is not a
philosophy of specialization. The professions, at present,
are all reviewing themselves and finding that they have in·
terpreted their roles too narrowly. Dental students are, for
example, being told that they do not work solely on teeth,
and that they must consider how the patient thinks and
feels. The practice of dentistry requires the continued
growth in the techniques of dentistry of course, but it also
requires growth in the knowledge and understandings of
one's patients' environmental situations.
Within the context of educational inqu iry, the criterion of growth can be adhered to without forcing all In·
quiry into one methodology. Theoretical and practical Inquiry are distinguishable, and this distinction does no vio·
lence to the foundations of pragmatism. In fact Dew·
ey's failure to retain this distinction led him to describe
in his Sources of a Science of Education, 1929, a meth·
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odology wh ich was quite Inhibiting to the growth of the
science of pedagogy.
In several papers I have tried to show that some of the
arguments from philosophy of science aimed at the riddle
of induction have great significance for how we view our
work In education." The arguments given by Levi and
Maxwell - wh ich I call the Levl·Maxwell thesis " -make it
very clear that epistemic goals or ends require methods
quite different from those required for the successful pursuit of practical goals. Since I have reviewed these
arguments within the context o f pedagogical research
elsewhere," I will here only briefly describe this approach.
What Maxwell succeeded in doing was to show us
how to deal with the problems -of selecting and modifying
a metaphysical framework within which empirical science
may be profitably conducted. Maxwell argues against
Kuhn and Popper holding that it is possible to reconstruct
our assumptions about rationality in light of our research
experience with them. He specifies the rules for so doing
in his "metamethodology." These rules grow out of his
view of science as aim-oriented; or in Levi's words, "the
aims of Inquiry control the legitimacy of inferences."
Thus, for both Levi and Maxwell, science must constantly
be re-evaluating its goals or ends in light of scientific experience with them . Maxwell goes beyond Levi, in
showing us how metaphysical assumptions are necessary
for, but controlled within, scientific Inquiry.
It is clear from this literature that Levi and Maxwell
are working with a means-ends analysi s of science, and
are properly seen in the tradition of pragmatic philosophy.
They have developed a neopragmatic analysis of scientific
inquiry. Their arguments have a fairly direct bearing upon
the direction and foundations of both empirical educa·
tional research and philosophy of education. Since pro·
gressivism in educational theory historically rested upon
pragmatist conceptions of psychology and philosophy,
and since there is warrant to claim that the Levi-Maxwell
thesis offers a neopragmatic foundation of scientific in·
quiry, I believe that there is reason to hold that the founda·
lions for a neoprogressivism in educational theory are at
this time in place rendering a neoprogressive view of edu·
cation and schooling readi ly producible. The required neo·
progressive philosophy is now in place.
6. Conclusion
I have tried to show the serious educationist that
there are good reasons to give attention to a neopro·
gressive theory of education. Ideas rooted in Dewey and
enhanced by current research in psychology and
philosophy provide the raw materials for us to begin to
carve out a nli!w conception of school Ing for the 1980s
which is worthy of a nation which has given leadership to
the world in both science and democracy. The conditions
are such that to view the earlier progressivism as nothing
more than history, reflects an ignorance of both the past
and the present. The future which this ignorance can write
is not worthy of us. The intellectual elements are at hand
to allow us- if we are really desirous and willing to make
the great effort-to recast the schools, teaching, study·
ing, and administration into forms where children and
young adults will want to go to school, study, and in·
quire; where teachers will want to meet their classes and
tell their medical and legal counterparts that they are pub·
lie school teachers; where principals and superintendents will smile at their students and teachers, and not be
asking whether more armed guards are required to walk
EDUCA T/ONAL CONSIDERATIONS
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their halls; where parents will see the schools they pay
dearly for as centers for inquiry and not the narcotics
market place. I put ii to you that these things can be; but
we, the educational theorists, will have to let them be
through our coming to grips with what the present offers
us.
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